

*Pre-Shakan age-group formation among the northern Nguni*¹

In seeking to explain the emergence of the Zulu kingdom in the early 19th century, students of northern Nguni history have so far generally focussed their attention on the development of what they call the Zulu 'military' system. They argue, or more often assume, that central to the socio-political transformations which were taking place in the Thukela-Phongolo region in the late 18th and early 19th centuries was the establishment in certain chiefdoms of new forms of 'regimental' organisation and new methods of waging warfare. Most historians have accepted without argument Bryant's assertions that these processes of reorganisation hinged on a change in the northern Nguni system of *buthaing*,² for forming young men and, in some cases perhaps, women into groups (*amabutho*) constituted on the basis of age-differences and having specific social functions to perform. Where male *amabutho* had previously served primarily as circumcision sets, Bryant maintains, by the early 19th century, at least, they had been transformed into units with a wider range of socially important duties expected of them. The *buthaing* of young women, if it had not previously existed, was established in the Zulu kingdom after Shaka's accession to power.³

If historians have — perhaps too uncritically — accepted Bryant's conclusion that major changes in the organisation and functioning of *amabutho* were taking place in the decades before and after 1800, they have tended to lose sight of two related points that he makes: first, that these changes were widespread among the northern Nguni chiefdoms, and second, that the reconstituted *amabutho* came to be used for 'general state purposes'.⁴ In what can be termed the conventional view of northern Nguni history, as expressed in the publications of scholars such as Gluckman, Omer-Cooper, and Thompson,⁵ the emphasis is on developments in the Mthethwa and Zulu kingdoms, and on the military functions of the male *amabutho*. The initial stages of these developments are associated with the rise of Dingiswayo and the Mthethwa kingdom, and its later stages with the rise of Shaka and the Zulu kingdom. Dingiswayo is seen as having abolished the practice of circumcision and, with it, the old circumcision schools, and as having conscripted the young men under his authority into an army organized into age-regiments, each of which would be called up to serve the king for part of every year. Shaka's contribution, it is commonly supposed, was to have introduced, firstly, full-time military service for all men until they had reached the age of 35 or 40; secondly the quartering of age-regiments in specially built barracks; thirdly, the conscription of young women into a parallel set of age-regiments; and fourthly, strict prohibitions on marriage outside the compass of conditions prescribed by the king, whereby men's age-regiments were successively released from full-time service as they reached the age of 'maturity', and given permission to take wives from designated women's regiments.

Two features of this image of the system of *buthaing* as developed by Dingiswayo and Shaka need to be noted. In the first place, as far as the functioning of the system is concerned, the men's *amabutho* are seen primarily as military formations. They represent groups of 'warriors' who have been 'conscripted', 'recruited', or 'enrolled' into 'regiments', housed in 'barracks', and are used mainly for fighting purposes, whether against external enemies or internal dissidents. Where other functions of the *amabutho* are recognised they usually receive only passing mention. The social significance of the forming of women's age-groups receives virtually no attention, and the restrictions on marriage are seen as serving primarily to increase the efficiency of the younger men as soldiers by bringing them under stricter discipline.

In the second place, as far as the impulse behind the transformation of *buthaing* is concerned, the conventional accounts have little to say. The idea propagated by Europeans in the 19th century that Dingiswayo learnt the basics of regimental organisation from some or other white men has almost, if not quite, disappeared,⁶ though an explanation of the same genre, that he may have copied the idea of age-regiments from some or other Sotho peoples, still survives.⁷ Currently more popular are the various mutations of Gluckman's 'population pressure' thesis, which in essence sees population growth in the northern Nguni area as having brought local chiefdoms into increasing competition with one another for land by the end of the 18th century, leading in the early 19th century, by a process which is never fully explained, to the emergence of conquest states such as the Mthethwa kingdom of Dingiswayo and the Ndwandwe of Zwide.⁸ An alternate hypothesis sees these conflicts as arising rather from the attempts made by certain chiefdoms to seize for themselves as large a share as possible of a supposedly growing trade with Europe through Delagoa Bay.⁹ In either case the development of the age-regiment system is seen primarily in terms of the need increasingly felt by rival political leaders for larger and more efficient fighting forces.

Though historians writing within the orthodox would have noted that chiefdoms such as the Ndwandwe, the Dlamini-Ngwane, and perhaps others, seem to have been developing age-regiment systems at much the same time as were the Mthethwa, they have made little attempt to account for this phenomenon except through vague statements such as exemplified in the comment that these systems 'arose naturally out of the stress of circumstances'.¹⁰ Where any more specific explanation is ventured, these developments are usually seen as responses to the same conditions of general unrest that produced the Mthethwa system. Thus, in default of any more incisive analysis, Dingiswayo and Shaka still tend to be seen as the 'innovators' of the age-regiment system, and the socio-political factors involved in its development are never properly considered.

The limitations of the conventional viewpoint are partly a function of paucity of source material on northern Nguni history before 1824, when the presence of literate observers on the scene first became a permanent reality, but also — and more important — of the perspectives so far adopted by most historians of the period.¹¹ Until very recently, writers of 'Zulu' history have been concerned more with chronicling political and military events than with analysing social change: hence the image of the *amabutho* as essentially military formations organized primarily for conducting warfare. In the last few years, however, a number of scholars have begun to open up new perspectives

on northern Nguni history by focussing on aspects of change in the regional political economy, that is, on changes in the means by which successive power-holding groups in the local chiefdoms sought to reproduce the material conditions which enabled them to maintain their positions of dominance. The pioneering work in this field has been done by Jeff Guy, who, in a series of as yet unpublished papers on the rise of the Zulu kingdom, introduces a new dimension into analysis of the position occupied by the *amabutho* in the Zulu social formation. In terms of his argument the male *amabutho* are not simply military formations, but also units performing labour for the state and effecting crucial reproductive functions. 'The basis of the king's power,' Guy writes, 'lay in the surplus labour (which) he extracted from every homestead within the kingdom, by means of the military system . . . Through the "military system" the king was able to draw on the labour of all Zulu men for perhaps a third of their productive lives'.¹² In similar vein, the restrictions imposed by the king on marriage

'not only allowed the king to divert labour power from the homestead into his service but also gave the king control over the process of reproduction within the kingdom . . . By delaying marriage . . . the king was able to delay the whole process of homestead formation within the kingdom. This sanction not only gave him dominance over the production process within each homestead but also had significant demographic implications . . .'¹³

In brief, 'the Zulu military system gave the king the means to control the process of reproduction and production within the Zulu kingdom'.¹⁴

Although Guy does not attempt to detail the processes by which the Zulu 'military' system developed, his introduction of a new line of argument serves to sharpen the debate on the subject. His thesis is that the origins of more systematic and larger-scale *buthaing* among the chiefdoms of northern Nguniland should be seen as a response to a socio-economic crisis that was developing in the region by at least the later 18th century, a crisis which he sees specifically as resulting from an increasing scarcity of good grazing and good agricultural land. Under these conditions, he argues,

'there would be advantages in assuming political control over a larger area of land and an increased number of people; in societies where human energy is the main source of social strength, there is a considerable degree of correlation between demographic magnitude and coercive potential . . . Moreover, an extension of territory would give members of the group access to a greater range of grazing and arable land . . .'¹⁵

Operating from a different starting point, Henry Slater has in his recently completed doctoral thesis reached conclusions similar in many respects to Guy's about the functions which *amabutho* were performing in northern Nguni society by the late 18th or early 19th century.¹⁶ He sees the crisis affecting northern Nguniland from the mid-18th century onward as resulting not so much from a deterioration in the quality of the environment, as Guy has argued, as from a growing labour shortage in the local trading states that were, in his view, already in existence before 1750. From about the mid-18th century, the power-holders in these states were, in response to an increase of European trade through Delagoa Bay and Port Natal, more and more concerned to expand their production of commodities intended for exchange, and hence to gain direct control over the labour-power of the 'peasantry' (to use

Slater's term) over whom they ruled. In the later 18th and early 19th centuries, therefore, previously 'feudal' societies were in the process of being transformed into 'absolutist' states, with the power-holders taking greater and greater powers for themselves at the expense of the peasantry.

Though few historians of south-eastern Africa are likely uncritically to accept Slater's new proposal of an old theme, namely that the dynamic for the rise of state systems in northern Nguniland was provided primarily by the impact of European trade, the materialist framework which he uses enables him to throw fresh light on the processes by which centralized kingdoms were established in the area. He sees the crucial developments in the process of centralization as being those by which power-holding groups extended their control over the labour-power of the peoples subordinate to them. In each developing state the political leaders sought to force the active adult males under their authority out of the business of producing for their own homesteads and into the business of performing labour for the state. The institutional framework necessary for the co-ordination of the activities of large numbers of men was provided by reorganisation of the army, which became an instrument to be used in attempts to expand the area of territory under its respective king's authority, and thus to enlarge the quantity both of natural resources and of labour-power at his command. In addition to their military duties, the men of the army herded the king's cattle, worked in his fields, and built his homesteads. Hence, as Bryant first pointed out nearly fifty years ago,¹⁷ 'the male regiments were essentially multi-functional organized labour gangs rather than regiments of professional soldiers'.¹⁸ Extension of control of the female labour force also took the form of 'regiment' formation, although women still spent most of their time in their homesteads, where their prime functions were to produce grain to feed the army, and, by rearing children, produce more labour-power for the state.

The thrust of these more recently developed arguments is, then, that the *amabutho* which were being formed in some, at least, of the northern Nguni chiefdoms from the late 18th century onward should not be seen simply as 'regiments' used by the leaders of emergent states as instruments of military aggression; rather, they were formations performing labour and reproductive functions, control of which was vital for power-holders who, for whatever reason, were seeking to expand both the scope and the span of their political authority. From this standpoint, state formation among the northern Nguni cannot be explained simply in terms of military conquest, but must also be understood as encompassing a major social transformation, central to which was the forming of these multi-functional *amabutho*. The question of how such *amabutho* came into being is thus crucial to any analysis of Nguni state formation.

The empirical data needed for essaying an answer to this question are minimal, but on the basis of information available in Bryant's works, in James Stuart's published Zulu readers, and in the Stuart Collection itself, some preliminary points can be formulated. The base-line for any discussion of the history of *buthaing* is, and will probably remain, Bryant's statement that before the emergence of the centralised states of the later 18th and early 19th centuries, northern Nguni age-groups functioned primarily as circumcision sets.¹⁹ Unless further documentary information on the history of this period comes to light, which is unlikely, historians have no way of testing how far

this assertion is true. Its corollary is that in the chiefdoms of the 'pre-state' period fighting men were organised not as age-groups but on some other basis, presumably a territorial one. But even before Dingiswayo had become king, 'military regiments were the universal Nguni custom', states Bryant in a passage which later writers have too often overlooked.²⁰ He makes clear that he is writing about age-regiments; hence, according to his line of reasoning, the transformation of circumcision age-groups into 'military' age-groups would have been well under way before 1800, not only in the Mthethwa sphere of influence as is commonly supposed, but in all Nguniland.

This time a certain amount of evidence bearing on the issue is available from other sources. In Stuart's records, Phakathwayo of the Qwabe, who died c. 1818 according to Bryant's reckoning, is described as having *butha'd* according to age.²¹ He had at least five 'regiments', two of which may have been formed by his father Khondlo.²² His contemporary, Macingwane of the Chungu, apparently had at least four regiments formed on an age-group basis.²³ Other chiefs of the time who are said to have had 'regiments' are Magaye of the Cele, who had five whose names are known, Zweide of the Ndwandwe who had four, and Matiwane of the Ngwane who had three.²⁴

To the extent that chiefs other than Dingiswayo and Shaka were *buthaing* 'military' age-groups in the early 19th century, Bryant's statement can be borne out, but his assertion that before Dingiswayo's time the formation of such regiments had become a 'universal' practice is questionable. In the Thembu chiefdom of Ngoza (d. in early 1820s), for instance, father and son are said to have fought in the same regiment.²⁵ This would indicate that in the early stages of Shaka's reign some independent chiefs were continuing to organize their fighting men as territorial rather than as age-based units. Shaka himself seems to have formed at least two territorial groups of warriors.²⁶ It is likely that before Shaka firmly established it in the Zulu kingdom the practice of *buthaing* militarized age-groups had been taking root in different northern Nguni chiefdoms at different times, and that in the early 19th century the transformation of circumcision sets to multi-functional 'regiments' was still, in some areas, an on-going process. Thus Phakathwayo's fighting men, after being *butha'd* into age-regiments, as indicated above, were then incorporated into a larger body consisting of men of different ages. And thus the Hlubi chief Bhungane, who died c. 1800, apparently had no 'regiments', whereas his successor Mthimkhulu formed at least one.²⁷

The dynamic underlying the transformation of the system of *buthaing* can perhaps best be understood in terms of the concepts formulated by Meillasoux, Terray, Dupré and Rey, and other scholars concerned with developing a materialist analysis of the structures of pre-capitalist African societies.²⁸ From this point of view the change in organization and function of the *amabutho* can be seen as part of a major social upheaval, which involved a restructuring not only of relationships between chiefdoms but also of the institutionalised relationships between elders and juniors, and between men and women. It can be argued that in a time of social crisis, such as seems to have affected northern Nguniland by at least the later 18th century, the male elders, who almost certainly formed the dominant element in Nguni society, would have sought to tighten their control over the means by which their position of dominance was reproduced through time. This would have entailed their taking firmer control over the labour-power of the society's primary producers,

that is, the women and the younger men, and also over the means by which that labour-power was reproduced, that is, over human reproduction. In the process, pre-existing institutions through which social control of young men was exercised, and through which access of unmarried men to unmarried women was regulated, were transformed. The final products of this transformation were the men's and women's *amabutho* formed in the Zulu kingdom under Shaka.

One indication of the extension of elders' control over young men may be seen in the abolition of circumcision. Conventionally, the disappearance of this practice, which apparently had once been widespread among the northern Nguni,²⁹ is explained in terms of the increasing militarisation of northern Nguni society.³⁰ Small-scale communities, it is argued, would have been especially vulnerable to attack when a large proportion of their potential fighting men were periodically secluded in circumcision schools; hence, in a time of increasing unrest it would have been logical for the practice of circumcision to be dropped. But in terms of the perspective outlined in the previous paragraph, the disappearance of circumcision should be seen as an indicator of the change taking place in the social relationships between older men and younger men. In the days when circumcision was still practised, according to Bryant, males were circumcised when 16-18 years old.³¹ If, as was presumably the case, circumcision rites functioned to mark the passage from youth to adulthood, young men would thus have attained social maturity comparatively early. In conditions where elders were seeking to extend the scope of their authority over juniors, it would have been to their advantage to abolish circumcision and replace it with another custom, such as the putting on of headrings, which could be carried out at a later stage in a man's life and so prolong the period when he was still regarded as a youth.

There is evidence to suggest that this is what was happening among the northern Nguni in the pre-Shaken period, with circumcision falling into disuse in different places at different times. Senzangakhona of the Zulu (born c. 1760) may or may not have been circumcised; his son Shaka (born in the late 1780s) was not.³² When Shaka began his reign c. 1816 the older men in his kingdom had apparently been circumcised, while the younger men had not.³³ Among the Mabaso, Nongila, father of one of Stuart's informants and a contemporary of Shaka, was circumcised, while among the Thembu, it is said, the practice was discontinued during the reign of Ngoza (d. early 1820s).³⁴ Among the Hlubi subject of the Zulu kingdom circumcision was still being practised well after 1820, as it was in the Swazi kingdom until the 1840s.³⁵

The origins of the practice of wearing headrings are unfortunately impossible to specify. It is said to have existed among the Mthethwa in the time of Dingiswayo's father Jobe, among the Qwabe in the time of Phakathwayo, and among the Thembu in the time of Ngoza.³⁶ But in one area, at least, it was introduced only after 1800, for it did not exist among the Hlubi in the time of Bhungane (died c. 1800), becoming established only during the reign of Mthimkhulu in the early 19th century, when, as has been mentioned above, the first *buthaing* of Hlubi 'regiments' also took place.³⁷

Documented evidence that elders were also extending their control over young women in the pre-Shakan period is virtually non-existent. One clue is perhaps to be found in the statements recorded by Bryant and Stuart that

izigodlo (sing. *isigodlo*), or establishments of unmarried women disposable by the chief in marriage, were formed by chiefs such as Senzangakhona of the Zulu, Phakathwayo of the Qwabe, Matiwane of the Ngwane, and Macingwane of the Chunu.³⁸ Bryant sees the formation of large *izigodlo* in Shaka's Zulu kingdom as a product specifically of the conquest period, and it may be that in the pre-Shakan period other successful leaders were beginning the practice which he continued.³⁹ Under Shaka, the formation, or enlarging, of *izigodlo* was paralleled by the establishment of women's *amabutho*. That this development was not restricted to the Zulu kingdom is evidenced by the fact that Mthimkhulu of the Hlubi had at least two female *amabutho*, although this is the only other case that has so far come to light.⁴⁰

There is some evidence, then, for the argument that Shaka's *amabutho* can be seen as the products of a process of social and political change that had begun in northern Nguniland decades before he came to power, change which hinged on the increasing exploitation by elders of the labour-power of young men and women through the system of *buthaing*. In the process of expanding the authority which they exercised within their communities, elders would presumably have come into increasingly sharp conflict with their juniors, conflict which could be contained only through the use of ever more stringent measures of repression, or, in other words, through greater exploitation. The violence, of a degree apparently unprecedented in the northern Nguni experience, which accompanied Shaka's conquests can perhaps partly be explained in terms of a rebellion by juniors against the restrictions increasingly placed on them over the previous decades, with young men now seeking not so much, it seems, to overturn the system which exploited them as to re-appropriate by force some of the products of the labour which elders had been extracting from them. The irony is, of course, that by the time the Shakan wars were over, the young men of the Zulu kingdom were more firmly subordinated to the new Zulu aristocracy than they had ever been to their own elders. The main instrument used at once to repress them and to co-ordinate their labour was the *amabutho* system, and so effective was it found by Shaka and his successors that with modifications, it remained the prime source of state-power for the sixty years of the kingdom's existence.

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NOTES

1. This article represents a revised version of a paper presented to a workshop on production and reproduction in the Zulu kingdom held in the University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, October, 1977.
2. The verb *ukubutha* means to gather, collect.
3. A. T. Bryant, *Olden Times in Zululand and Natal*, London, 1929, pp. 98-9, 641-2; and *The Zulu People*, Pietermaritzburg, 1949, pp. 489-95.
4. Bryant, *Olden Times*, pp. 641, 642.
5. M. Gluckman, 'The kingdom of the Zulu of South Africa', in M. Fortes and E. Evans-Pritchard, eds., *African Political Systems*, London, 1940, pp. 25-55; 'The rise of a Zulu empire', *Scientific American*, 202 (1960), pp. 157-68; 'The individual in a social framework', *Jnl. Af. Studies*, 1 (1974), pp. 113-44; J. D. Omer-Cooper, *The Zulu Aftermath*, London, 1966, ch. 2; 'The Nguni outburst', in J. Flint, ed., *Cambridge History of Africa*, vol. 5, Cambridge, 1976, ch. 9; L. Thompson, 'Co-operation and conflict: the Zulu kingdom and Natal', in M. Wilson and L. Thompson, eds., *Oxford History of South Africa*, vol. 1, Oxford, 1969, ch. 9.
6. Gluckman, though sceptical of it, was still prepared to consider the idea as late as 1974: see his 'Individual in a social framework', p. 136.

7. Omer-Cooper, *Zulu Aftermath*, p. 27; 'Nguni outburst', p. 323; Gluckman, 'Individual in a social framework', p. 136.
8. Gluckman, 'The kingdom of the Zulu', pp. 25-6; Omer-Cooper, *Zulu Aftermath*, pp. 25, 27; 'Nguni outburst', pp. 321-3; Thompson, 'Co-operation and conflict', pp. 340-1.
9. E.g. A. Smith, 'The trade of Delagoa Bay as a factor in Nguni politics', in L. Thompson, ed., *African Societies in Southern Africa*, London, 1969, ch. 8; M. Wilson, *Divine Kings and the 'Breath of Man'*, Cambridge, 1959, p. 24.
10. Omer-Cooper, 'Nguni outburst', p. 325.
11. The primary sources are: (i) an enclosure to an official despatch first prepared by Theophilus Shepstone in 1864, but not more widely available until 1883, when it was published in Cape of Good Hope Blue Book G.4, *Report and Proceedings of the Government Commission on Native Laws and Customs*, part II, pp. 415-26; (ii) a lecture given by Shepstone and originally published in 1875, but not more widely available until its republication in J. Bird, ed., *Annals of Natal*, vol. 1, Pietermaritzburg, 1888, pp. 155-66; (iii) a manuscript written by Henry Fynn c. 1840, but not published until 1888, when it appeared in Bird's *Annals*, vol. 1, pp. 60-71.
12. J. J. Guy, 'Ecological factors in the rise of Shaka and the Zulu kingdom', paper presented to conference on southern African history, National University of Lesotho, August 1977, p. 14.
13. J. J. Guy, 'Production and exchange in the Zulu kingdom', paper presented to workshop on precapitalist social formations and colonial penetration in southern Africa, National University of Lesotho, July 1976, p. 9.
14. Guy, 'Ecological factors', p. 16.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
16. Henry Slater, 'Transitions in the political economy of south-east Africa before 1840', unpublished D. Phil. thesis, University of Sussex, 1976. See in particular ch. 9.
17. In *Olden Times*, p. 78.
18. Slater, 'Transitions', p. 307.
19. See note 3 above.
20. In *Olden Times*, p. 641.
21. C. de B. Webb and J. B. Wright, eds., *The James Stuart Archive*, vol. 1, Pietermaritzburg, 1976, evidence of Kambi, p. 210; Bryant, *Olden Times*, p. 186.
22. Bryant, *Olden Times*, pp. 99, 185, 198; J. Stuart, *uBaxoxele*, London 1924, p. 28; Webb and Wright, eds., *Stuart Archive*, vol. 1, evidence of Kambi, p. 210.
23. Killie Campbell Africana Library, James Stuart Collection, File 62, nbk. 71, evidence of Magidigidi, p. 3.
24. Stuart Collection, File 61, nbk. 52, evidence of Mageza, p. 23; Webb and Wright, eds., *Stuart Archive*, vol. 1, evidence of Luzipo, p. 354; Bryant, *Olden Times*, pp. 99, 141.
25. Webb and Wright, eds., *Stuart Archive*, vol. 1, evidence of Lugubu, p. 286; evidence of Lunguza, p. 299; Bryant, *Olden Times*, p. 244.
26. These were the men of the ebaQulusini homestead in the north-west of the Zulu kingdom, and those of the oSebeni homestead in the south-west. See Bryant, *Olden Times*, pp. 42, 181; C. de B. Webb and J. B. Wright, eds., *A Zulu King Speaks*, Pietermaritzburg, 1978, pp. 14n, 26, 32-3, 40.
27. Webb and Wright, eds., *Stuart Archive*, vol. 1, evidence of Kambi, p. 210; Stuart Collection, File 59, nbk. 29, evidence of Mabonsa, p. 35.
28. C. Meillassoux, 'From reproduction to production', *Economy and Society*, 1 (1972), pp. 93-105; 'The social organisation of the peasantry: the economic basis of kinship', *Jnl. Peasant Studies*, 1 (1973), pp. 81-90; C. Dupré and P.-P. Rey, 'Reflections on the pertinence of a theory of the history of exchange', *Economy and Society*, 2 (1973), pp. 131-63; E. Terray, *Marxism and 'Primitive' Societies*, New York and London, 1972, pp. 95-186. See also M. Mackintosh, 'Reproduction and patriarchy: a critique of Claude Meillassoux, "Femmes, Greniers et Capitaux"', *Capital and Class*, 2 (1977), pp. 119-27.
29. Bryant, *Zulu People*, p. 490; Webb and Wright, eds., *Stuart Archive*, vol. 1, evidence of Jantshi, p. 195.
30. Omer-Cooper, 'Nguni outburst', p. 324. See also E. J. Krige, *The Social System of the Zulus*, Pietermaritzburg, 1950 ed., pp. 116-17.
31. *Zulu People*, p. 490.
32. Stuart Collection, File 60, nbk. 29, evidence of Madikane, p. 3; Bryant, *Olden Times*, pp. 46, 122, 571; *Zulu People*, p. 492; A. F. Gardiner, *Narrative of a Journey to the Zoolu Country*, London, 1836, repr. Cape Town, 1966, p. 95.
33. Bryant, *Zulu People*, p. 492, quoting Arbousset, *Narrative of an Exploratory Tour*, Cape Town, 1846, p. 139.

34. Webb and Wright, eds., *Stuart Archive*, vol. 1, evidence of Jantshi, pp. 189, 195; evidence of Lunguza, p. 301; Bryant, *Olden Times*, p. 244.
35. Stuart Collection, File 59, nbk. 29, evidence of Mabonsa, pp. 33, 38; P. Bonner, 'Early state formation among the Nguni: the relevance of the Swazi case', unpublished paper presented to the African History Seminar, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, January 1978, p. 4.
36. Bryant, *Olden Times*, pp. 85, 87; Webb and Wright, eds., *Stuart Archive*, vol. 1, evidence of Kambi, p. 210; evidence of Lunguza, p. 315.
37. Stuart Collection, File 59, nbk. 29, evidence of Mabonsa, p. 52.
38. Bryant, *Olden Times*, p. 46; Stuart, *uBaxoxele*, pp. 27, 29, 31.
39. Bryant, *Olden Times*, p. 52.
40. Stuart Collection, File 59, nbk. 29 evidence of Mabonsa on sheet attached to front cover.